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Abstract
Significantly informed by strategic considerations, the Sino-Japanese diplomatic 
normalization in 1972 was a side-product of the US-China rapprochement. Due 
to the speedy negotiations that lasted only five days, the bilateral relations remain 
fragile, non-institutionalized and personal character-oriented, leaving numbers 
of issues remain unresolved, such as the handling of the problems left by the 
previous Sino-Japanese War, the consolation to war victims, and the rebuilding 
of a long-term relationship. Attempts on cooperation and institutionalization 
between the two countries have been carried out in the 1980s and the 2000s 
respectively, but the relations significantly deteriorated thereafter due to the anti-
Japanese demonstrations in 2005 and the fishing trawler collision incident near 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2010. As the fierce anti-Japanese 
demonstrations erupted in China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial 
dispute in September 2012, the Sino-Japanese relations reached its nadir since the 
diplomatic normalization of the two countries. This paper discusses forty years of 
transformations of Sino-Japanese relations, issues that is unresolved after the 1972 
negotiations and attempts on institutionalization of cooperative frameworks. In the 
addendum, this paper also analyzes the anti-Japanese demonstrations in September 
2012 and suggests three emergency proposals to avoid the two countries from 
entering a “new Cold War”.
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1. The Transformation of Sino-Japanese Relations 
   over the Forty Years since Normalization
A Fragile Structure
September 2012 marked the fortieth anniversary of normalization of diplomatic 
relations　between China and Japan. After five days of tensed negotiations in 
Beijing, the normalization　was finally realized between newly instated Japanese 
Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi, and 
Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. It had already been 
twenty seven years since the end of the Sino-Japanese War, and twenty three years 
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Have Sino-Japanese relations matured enough over the past 40 years? 
Unfortunately, with the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 and the fishing 
trawler collision incident near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (called the Diaoyu 
Islands in China; for convenience, they will be referred to as the Senkaku Islands 
below) in 2010 and 2012, the bilateral relations has instead become unstable. 
Moreover, mutual image at the level of public opinion in both countries has been 
deteriorating.
The author considers that this unstable relationship roots in the structural 
fragility of Sino-Japanese relations since the normalization. The 1972 
normalization, as a matter of fact, left many unresolved problems that have not 
been addressed ever since. As touched upon in author’s book, Sino-Japanese 
Relations: From Post-WWII to a New Era, Sino-Japanese relations have continued 
to be a fragile relationship, characterized by lacking of institutions, overemphasis 
on personal elements, and are affected by sentiment, rather than reasoning.1 Also, 
in addition to these old issues, new problems regarding the Senkaku Islands and 
the East China Sea have complicated the relations between the two countries.
In the following part, Section 1 reviews the transformations of the basic 
structure in the bilateral relations over the past forty years. Section 2 identifies 
what was left unresolved during the 1972 normalization between China and 
Japan. Section 3 discusses attempts on cooperation over institutionalization in the 
bilateral relations. Section 4 will elucidate the impact of the 2012 anti-Japanese 
protests in China for the future course of Sino-Japanese relations. Finally, Section 
5 surveys the prospect of Sino-Japanese relations by suggesting a three-pronged 
emergency proposal.
1 Kazuko Mori, Nicchu kankei: Sengo kara shinjidai e [Sino-Japanese Relations: From Post-
WWII to a New Era] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006) (Chinese edition, Beijing: Leterature of 
Social Sciences Publishing House, 2009).
5Forty Years of Transformation: A Period-by-Period Classification
The Sino-American rapprochement in 1971 led to a thaw in Sino-Japanese 
relations. After five days of negotiations, Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations were 
normalized on September 29, 1972.  For the next 40 years, the relationship went 
through many twists and turns. Unfortunately, not only has the relationship failed 
to improve, with new issues emerging without the old ones being resolved, and 
with the addition of new actors such as the citizenry and public opinion, there has 
also been an increase in the likelihod of conflict, mistrust, and destabilization. 
This 40-year period is divided and discussed into four parts.
（1）The 1970s: A Period of Strategic Friendship
Normalization brought China-mania in Japan. This was because the citizenry, the 
financial sector and the political sector (excluding those aligned with Taiwan) had 
in fact been anticipating diplomatic normalization with China since the 1960s. 
Still, it was too much to hope for enthusiasm for Japan in China, where the embers 
of the Cultural Revolution still smoldered.  Nixon and Kissinger’s rapprochement 
with China was purely strategic. Aiming towards an “honorable withdrawal” from 
Vietnam and a turn for the better in the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, 
the process resulted in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization also having 
strong strategic qualities. In particular, China was thinking about strategically 
resisting its primary enemy, the Soviet Union, and hastened the improvement 
of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Beijing was also hurried by the fact that 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were in advanced age. Although it took seven more 
years for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the PRC to be 
concluded due to circumstances in both countries, Sino-Japanese relations in the 
1970s could be basically conceived as amicable.
（2）The 1980s to the mid-1990s: A Period of Coordination and Development
For Beijing, after deciding on advocating policy of modernization at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, the launch of Ohira 
administration in Japan which was enthusiastic about articulating cooperative 
relations with China, was fortunate. In addition, the booming international 
economy of the 1980s provided tailwind to Chinese modernization. For the fifteen 
years of this period, as the US and Japan favored a “strong and stable China”, the 
Sino-Japanese relations had been able to maintain a stable status despite repeated 
friction over the historical problem, such as the textbook revisions. Prof. Ezra 
Vogel considered the 1980s to be the decade of the “Golden Triangle” between the 
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US, China and Japan. 2
The epitome of the favorable bilateral relations was the provision of government 
loan to China starting from 1980. Table 1 indicates the share by country of 
government loan that China received from the 1980s. As the data shows, Japan’s 
dominant role is evident. China also accepted the bilateral structure of “a country 
giving support and a country receiving support.”
Rank Country 100 Millions of US dollars Item Count Percent of 
Total %
1 Japan 97.27 72 41.91
2 Germany 22.89 42 9.86
3 France 19.56 80 8.42
4 Spain 18.32 107 7.89
5 Italy 16.21 47 6.98
Total   223.8 1351 100
Table 1: Japan’s Share of Foreign Government Loan received by China
 (Cumulative values 1979-1999, Top Five)
Source: Xiaoguang Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu yu zhongri guanxi [Japan’s ODA and 
Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House 2003), p.381. For 
an evaluation of Japan’s aid contribution to China’s external liberalization see Zhaokui Feng, 
“Zhongguo de gaigekaifang yu ribenyinsu” [China’s Reform and the Japan Factor] , World 
Economics and Politics 10 (2008), pp. 7-15. Feng points to the fact that Japan’s aid helped 
China to: (1) Resolve severe capital shortfall (40% of basic construction costs in the 1980s); 
(2) stimulate expansion in China’s trade and FDI; (3) provided technological assistance, and 
(4) promoted environmental protection.
(3) The Mid-1990s to 2004: A Period of Structural Change
1995 marked the fifty-year anniversary of the end of the Sino-Japanese War. From 
this year onward, the structure of the Sino-Japanese relations changed significantly 
in several dimensions. 
　The first epochal change was the end of the Cold War and thus the conclusion 
of the post-war period. In particular, most Japanese people believed that “the post-
war period ended.” The problem was that in China, where the level of domestic 
opening was increasing due to economic growth and the emergence of internet, it 
was the first period when the Chinese people could voice their opinions about the 
Sino-Japanese War and the post-war settlement. In other words, in China, this is 
when the post-war period started. The second change came with China’s economic 
growth and development into a powerhouse at a time when the Japanese economy 
entered a long period of stagnation. The structure of the relations, namely “a 
country giving support and a country receiving support”, greatly altered. The third 
2  Ezra Vogel et al., ed., The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989 (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002).
7change was the result of tensions that arose across the Taiwan Strait due to the 
election of the first Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui who supported Taiwan’s 
independence. In response to China’s missile tests, the US sent two aircraft 
carriers to the Taiwan Strait. As a result, public opinion in Japan came to distrust 
and dislike China. 
  It was in 1995-1996 that the controversial debate regarding the renunciation 
of war clause in the Japanese constitution started to tilt towards a revision. This 
epitomized the “end of the post-war period” in Japan.3
(4) From 2005 to Today: A Period of Anxiety and Distrust
The most recent period began with the anti-Japanese demonstrations that occurred 
in the urban areas of China in the spring of 2005. The trigger of these events was 
the annual visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi starting 
from 2001, despite China’s furious criticism. The anti-Japanese demonstrations 
outbroke due to an old issue, but new issues have also been surfacing. As seen in 
the “poisoned dumpling incident” in 2008, safety problems on the level of day-
to-day life have also surfaced. Additionally, conflicts relating to interests, such 
as the territories of the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea, and the conflict 
regarding rare earth metals have come to the fore.
   What is common to these controversies is the fact that public opinion, including 
their voice on the internet, has a large influence on the bilateral relations (much 
of the public opinion is extremely emotional). The governmental and diplomatic 
authorities have also demonstrated a decreasing capability on controlling the 
situation.  In China, opening-up and marketization have caused the pluralization of 
interests. Major companies involved in arms production and natural resource have 
started meddling in diplomacy. In Japan, political instability caused the loss of 
controlling ability and the absence of diplomacy. Figures 1 and 2 below show the 
change of mutual image of both countries. Although there is data indicating that at 
least 80% of Japanese people do not feel affinity towards China, there is notable 
data from the first half of 2012 (before the demonstrations regarding the Senkaku 
Islands) indicating that at least half of university students in Beijing considered 
Japan to be “normal.” It is also telling that unlike in 2005, the major force behind 
demonstrations in 2012 was not the university students.
3 For detailed data on Japan’s changing view of constitution, see Iokibe, Makoto, ed., 
Sengo nihon gaikoshi [Post-war Japanese Diplomatic History] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku 
2006), p. 108.
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Highly friendly        2.30%
Friendly 10.6
General 53.2
Unfriendly 21.8
Very unfriendly 10.4
Unclear, no response   1.7
Figure 1: The View of Japan by Chinese University Students in Beijing
Source: An April/May 2012 survey of 10 universities collecting 2029 responses (92.2% 
response rate) in: Xingyu Wang, “Zhongguo daxuesheng duiri renzhi de wen juan diaozha” 
[The poll data on the view of Japan by Chinese university students] Riben Xuekan 
[Japanese Studies] (Issue 5, 2012), pp. 125- 140.
Figure 2: Japanese View on Diplomatic Relations with China and South Korea
Source: Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, Public Opinion Polls on Diplomacy. Survey 
conducted during October-December of each year, randomly selecting 1800 people. Only the 
2011 poll was conducted in January 2012, at < http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h24/h24-gaiko/
index.html > (searched date: November 24, 2012).
2. A Re-examination of the 1972 Normalization: 
   What was Left Unresolved
What was Left Unresolved during the 1972 Normalization: the Source of 
Suspicion
Forty years has passed. The time has come to review the 1972 normalization itself 
9from a long-term perspective. The author came to think this way after reading 
Hattori Ryuji’s Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization.4 Another reason for 
rethinking the conventional understanding is the large-scale, violent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations over the Senkaku Islands in September 2012. 
Hattori Ryuji’s Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization has two major 
points. First, it points out an important fact that despite the three principles for 
restoring Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, which the Chinese side firmly stuck 
to (namely, the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of 
China; Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of China, and the 1952 Treaty 
of Taipei is unlawful and should be annulled), the treaty negotiations concluded 
with Japan in an advantageous position with respect to the second and third 
principle. Ultimately, Japan succeeded in only going so far as to state that it “fully 
understands and respects” China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, and that 
Japan “firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.” 
In addition, Japan succeeded in removing the reference to the Treaty of Taipei 
from the Joint Communiqué, instead handling this with a unilateral explanation by 
Foreign Minister Ohira that “the Treaty of Taipei has been terminated.”
Second, the book demonstrates the success of diplomatic normalization 
was highly dependent on the partnership between political leaders and the 
bureaucracy, primarily in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the efforts 
of the primary parties who engaged in the normalization negotiations. Hattori 
emphasizes that in the 1972 negotiations, China conceded quite a bit, and that 
it was actually Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai who were zealous and hurried for 
normalization. In other words, Hattori’s basic view is that Japan gained more in 
the 1972 negotiations and conceded little, and thus was successful.
Nevertheless, the author is not satisfied in the following three points. First, 
Hattori’s evaluation is too narrow. He argues that Japanese ulterior motives had 
run through the 1972 diplomatic negotiations and Japanese diplomatic success 
was a question of negotiation tactics, and “how much this is understood in today’s 
China is a separate issue.” The official understanding in China is that Japan had 
recognized China’s three principles for restoring diplomatic relations. The 1972 
negotiations should be strictly reexamined not as a diplomatic game but as a 
historical settlement for both two countries as a new start.
Second, as Hattori also notes, there is the problem of “the hearts of the Chinese 
people, who were subjected to unprecedented wartime damage, and who were 
sidelined by the diplomatic normalization.” To be sure, many Japanese people 
considered it a “success” that there was no claim for compensation during the 
4 Ryuji Hattori, Nicchu kokko seijoka [Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization] (Tokyo: 
Chuko Shinsho, 2011).  
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1972 negotiations. In 2005, the “Chinese people who were abandoned” once again 
turned their strong criticism towards Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai’s fundamental 
principle with respect to Japan (the “binary theory” of differentiating Japanese 
militarists from the ordinary Japanese people). As a consequence, the 1972 
negotiations was not a sufficient settlement of the previous war, and suspicion and 
distrust toward Japan remained among the Chinese people.
Third, there is one more issue that was left unresolved. What the Japanese 
side struggled with the most during the 1972 negotiations was how to achieve 
consistency between the negotiations and the “fictitious policy towards China.” 
That is, diplomatically treating mainland China as if it did not exist while 
considering relations with Taiwan as the totality of relations with China as it had 
been diplomatic practice since the 1950s. In other words, the conundrum was how 
to defend the “fictitious policy towards China.”  Was Japan’s decision in the 1950s 
the correct one? How should the policy towards China and towards the US be? 
The 1972 negotiations did not handle these questions, and the crucial issue was 
left untouched.
The unresolved problems mentioned above were not discussed afterwards. As a 
result, the suspicion and distrust in China has never been cleared out, and instead 
significantly accumulated. This bounced back to Japanese, leading to an increase 
of anti-China sentiment in the Japanese society. In this way, 40 years has passed.
Old and New Issues between Japan and China
Disputes over maritime resources and territory, such as the Senkaku Islands, are 
new issues following the 1970s when China (and Taiwan) officially began to 
assert their territorial rights. What other problems are there between Japan and 
China?
The disputes and issues have emerged between the two countries since 
1972 are, in a simplified manner, as depicted in Figure 3. The first layer is the 
problems of historical understanding. It is the basic layer that can be classified 
as issues of values that emerge due to the continuation of problems before 1972. 
These problems have continued to smolder and erupted occasionally. They 
are troublesome problems that reside in the layers of history between the two 
countries. 
The second layer related to power. They are disputes and conflicts regarding 
strategy, power, and regional leadership such as the US-Japanese alliance, the 
Taiwan problem, and the issue of Japan’s seeking for a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council. These can be considered issues that have emerged since 1972. 
However, in the case of Taiwan, regional leadership, the root of these issues 
goes back to pre-1972 history. Therefore, problems of the first layer are often 
intertwined with those of the second. 
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The third layer consists of disputes relating to specific interests, such as natural 
resources as well as land and maritime territory. It appears that since 2010, history 
problems between China and Japan have receded and conflicts over power and 
interests, and territorial disputes have become prevalent.  
　　Figure 3: Issues between Japan and China; A Three-layer Structure of Values, 　　
　    Power and Interests
　　Source: By author
The unique structure of the Sino-Japanese relations means that conflicts over 
power (the second layer) and conflicts over interests (the third layer) often become 
entangled with the conflicts in the first layer. In fact, it is a character of the Sino-
Japanese relations that it is not possible to use reason to handle the kind of 
disputes over the reasoning of power and interests that exist in any other bilateral 
relations. The crucial point is that what is behind those disputes.  Mutual distrust 
and suspicions lay in the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations, aggravating the 
conflicts at the third and second levels and causing unnecessarily disputes to be 
escalated. Why can the strong suspicion and distrust at the foundation not be 
eliminated, and why are they continuously amplified?
3. Attempts at Institutionalizing the Sino-Japanese 
   Relations－ The Fourth Period
The Start of Institutionalization: Five Channels
The bilateral relations in the 21st century (the fourth period) faced a period of 
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structural crisis. After a drastic change in the strategic environment in the East 
Asian region, the rise of China and the political instability in Japan, the trust 
between Japan and China crumbled fundamentally due to Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s visits of Yasukuni Shrine. Since the inauguration of the Abe cabinet in 
October 2006, mutual visits by Japanese and Chinese leaders were made at least 
once per year and the relations began to recover.  
Meanwhile, mechanisms for dialogue and consultation were launched at a 
variety of levels. Up until this point, the Sino-Japanese relations were extremely 
informal and had an intrinsic fragility. Thus, the attempt at “institutionalization” 
can be viewed as a major transformation. Five primary mechanisms for dialogue 
and cooperation between China and Japan are discussed as follows:
(1) Comprehensive Policy Dialogue (Japan-China Strategic Dialogue)
Through diplomatic channels immediately before the anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions in February 2005, the Chinese side proposed holding talks on Taiwan and 
North Korea over the issue on the establishment of a security arrangement in East 
Asia. China also initiated a similar strategic dialogue with the US in 2004, which 
was launched in August 2005. Furthermore, in December 2006, the US-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the High-Level Economic Dialogue at the 
ministerial level between Japan and China were set up.
The Japan-China Strategic Dialogue (initially called the Comprehensive Policy 
Dialogue in Japan) started at the end of the Koizumi administration in May 2005 
and continued through meetings in June 2005, October 2005, February 2006, June 
2006, September 2006, January 2007, February 2008, June 2009, February 2011, 
and most recently the eleventh meeting between the Vice-Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs Sasae Kenichiro and Zhang Zhijun in June 2012.
The first major country to which China proposed a strategic relationship was 
Russia in 1996.“Strategic” does not presuppose matching interests, but has the 
triple connotation of being long-term, full-scale and global. It is likely that China’s 
call for “strategic dialogue” with Japan was a manifestation of an intention to 
propel the Sino-Japanese relationship to the same framework as the relationship 
with other major powers such as the US and Russia. Incidentally, when the US-
China Strategic Dialogue began, a Chinese debater argued that the purpose of 
the strategic dialogue was to “eliminate mistaken strategic decisions to certain 
degree.”5 
(2) High-Level Economic Dialogue
5 Zhongying Pang, “Xinlang jiu zhongmei zhanlue duihua-lianxianguojiwentizhuanjia,” [Sina-
net interviewed international relations specialists on the issue of Sino-American strategic dia-
logue] Sina Net (August 1, 2005), at < http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-08-01/20557383048.
shtml > (searched date: November 11, 2012).
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The High-Level Economic Dialogue began in December 2007, spurred 
by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Japan in April of the same year. It 
developed out of the Japan-China Economic Partnership Consultation that had 
been operating since 2002.The four themes are macroeconomic adjustment, 
cooperation in environmental protection, cooperation in trade and investment, 
and regional/international economic problems.The attendees on the Japanese side 
include the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal 
Policy, the Minister of the Environment, and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fisheries. On the Chinese side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman 
of the National Development and Reform Commission, the Minister of Finance, 
the Minister of Agriculture, a Vice Minister of Commerce, and the head of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection participate in the meetings. This is literally 
a high-level ministerial consultation regarding the economy.
However, while the economic strategic dialogue between the US and China that 
started a year earlier is progressing well, the dialogue between Japan and China 
has not gone smoothly. Particularly, problems emerged since the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) took the power. The controversy over the Chinese restrictions of 
rare earth element exports in September 2010 is the most prominent example.
(3) Talks Regarding Problems in the East China Sea
This mechanism for dialogue at the level of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims at the demarcation of boundaries in the East 
China Sea, the exchange of opinions on joint development, and the peaceful 
resolution of problems in the East China Sea. It began in October 2004 and had 
been convened 12 times by June 2008.
There was an “important development” at the 12th meeting in 2008, when a 
basic consensus for joint development of the East China Sea gas field by Japan 
and China was reached. However, the relationship deteriorated with the Japanese 
seizure of a Chinese fishing trawler near the Senkaku Islands in September 2010, 
which resulted in furious Chinese protests. During Japanese Prime Minister 
Noda’s visit to China in the end of 2011, Japan and China agreed to create a 
security mechanism to prevent maritime conflict, including the installation of a 
military hotline. Japan-China talks on maritime affairs began in May 2012 (in 
Hangzhou). It is expected that talks about the East China Sea will expand and 
come to be held regularly.6
6 “Jiedu zhongri haiyang anbao cuoshang cheng diaoyudao cheng hexin wenti,”  [Interpreting 
China-Japan maritime security talk: Diaoyudao problem became core issue ] People’s Daily 
Online (May 15, 2012) at < http://www.chinanews.com/gj/2012/05-15/3889318.shtml> 
(searched date: November 15, 2012).
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(4) Defense Vice-Ministerial Level Talks
The Japan-China defense dialogue began with vice-ministerial level talks in 
1997. These meetings and mutual visits by high-level defense officials (the head 
of the Japan Defense Agency, later became the Ministry of Defense) are the two 
channels that continue to the present day. By July 2011, the vice-ministerial talks 
had been held nine times.
According to the information that has been passed along, the vice-ministerial 
talks are a formality where every time the Japanese side asks for greater 
transparency of China’s military strength and strategy, and the Chinese side 
consistently makes requests to Japan with respect to the status of Taiwan.
(5) Joint History Research Committee
The problem of historical understanding between Japan and China came to 
the fore and dominated bilateral relations during the Koizumi era. After Japanese 
Prime Minister Abe’s visit to an APEC conference in China in October 2006, 
an agreement was reached between the foreign ministers of Japan and of China, 
Aso Taro and Li Zhaoxing, respectively, to “implement a Japan-China Joint 
History Research Committee based on the spirit of looking squarely at history 
and facing the future.” This resulted in “joint research regarding the 2000-year 
history of exchanges, the unfortunate history of the modern period up to 1945, 
and the history of the development of relations after WWII.” The committee was 
launched in December 2006 with the Japan Institute of International Affairs as the 
contact on the Japanese side and the Institute of Modern History at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) as the contact on the Chinese side. The 
Japanese chairman is Kitaoka Shinichi, Professor at the University of Tokyo and 
the Chinese chairman is Bu Ping, Director of the Institute of Modern History at 
CASS. The first meeting was held in December 2006, the second in March 2007, 
and the third in January 2008. At the fourth meeting in December 2009, both sides 
released a report, ending the first stage. The report went no further than to state 
the historical understanding of each side, and there is no plan for when to start the 
second stage. Thus, this channel for intergovernmental discussion regarding the 
history problem is at a very fragile state compared with that between Japan and 
South Korea.
Looking at the Sino-Japanese channels for intergovernmental communication, 
which could barely be maintained, it appears that the Chinese side is motivated 
towards institution-building and, aside from joint research on the history problem, 
is using the relationship with the US as a model. However, on the one hand 
China’s attempts at institutionalizing its relationship with Japan and bringing it 
up to a strategic level have been at the mercy of public opinion voiced on the 
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internet. This became particularly apparent with regard to territorial issues. On 
the other hand, since the start of the DPJ administration in 2008, there has been 
none of the initiative that we should see in Japan’s China policy. There is simply 
an absence of diplomacy. Amidst such circumstances, both countries have fallen 
into a vicious cycle in which conflicts over land, sea territory and resources incite 
stormy nationalism, stirring up unease, distrust, and suspicions at the citizen level 
in both countries.
The Vagueness of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common 
  Strategic Interests”
Starting from 2006, faint glimmers of possible progress in institutionalizing Sino-
Japanese relations became visible. However, with the political instability and 
absence of diplomacy since 2008, and the fishing trawler collision incident near 
the coast of the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 as well as the August 2012 
controversy over the purchase of some of the islands by the Japanese government, 
the extreme thinness and fragility of the newly-formed Sino-Japanese channels 
and institutions was exposed.There is no consensus between the two countries 
about important issues such as the actual meaning and content of the “mutually 
beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” which was mutually 
agreed upon during the Abe and Fukuda administrations.
The first time the Sino-Japanese relationship was characterized as a “mutually 
beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” was in a joint 
press released on “Building a Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on 
Common Strategic Interests” when Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited China 
in October 2006. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Japan in April 
of the following year, Wen stated that he considered the “spirit” of the mutually 
beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests to be “contributions 
and responsibility for peace and stability in Asia and the world, cooperation at 
the bilateral, multilateral, and international levels, and an expansion of shared 
interests,” and noted the following five points as specific components:
(1) Building a politically trusting relationship through leader visits, greater 
political transparency, and organizational exchanges.
(2) Cooperating for mutual benefit in areas including resources, environment, 
finance, communication and intellectual property.
(3) Maintaining regional stability through dialogue and exchanges with respect 
to defense issues.
(4) Engaging in human and cultural exchanges among youths, the media, cities, 
and the citizenry.
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(5) Cooperating with regard to regional and global problems such as the North 
Korean nuclear problem, UN Security Council reform, ASEAN-style “open, 
transparent, and inclusive” cooperation in the East Asian region.
Strategic dialogue is required for the very reason that relationships are unstable 
and involve sensitive issues. Japan, however, has been extremely vague in 
response to China’s clear resolve that it is necessary to create a mutually beneficial 
relationship based on common strategic interests. According to Prime Minister 
Fukuda when he visited China, a “mutually beneficial relationship based on 
common strategic interests” would have the following three pillars.
(1) Mutually beneficial cooperation, especially in the field of the environment 
and energy conservation, and in intellectual property protection.
(2) International contribution in the fight against terrorism, the abduction 
problem and denuclearization in North Korea, UN Security Council reform, 
and assisting the poor in Africa.
(3) Mutual understanding and trust, through increasing dialogue, understanding, 
and trust in the areas of youth exchanges, intellectual exchanges, and 
security.7
On the Chinese side as well, dissatisfaction exists over the “strategic dialogue” 
with Japan. According to one view, “to begin with, strategic dialogue is attempting 
to deal with both a bilateral relationship from a sophisticated strategic perspective, 
and international problems that both parties have an interest in,” and dialogue 
centered on the future and crisis management is proceeding between the US and 
China as “responsible powers.” The strategic dialogue with Japan, however, is 
entangled by the future and the history problem. As a consequence, the precise 
“placement” is difficult to be positioned, and most of the dialogue is about the 
history problem and the bilateral relationship.8
To make the Sino-Japanese “mutually beneficial relationship based on 
common strategic interests” to being truly “strategic,” it is necessary for Japanese 
diplomacy to have a regional  and global strategy, and for both sides to have a 
relationship in which they frankly assert their strategy and interests in the world 
and the region.
7 Speech given by Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda at Peking University on December 28, 
2007.
8 Wang Yiwei, “Zhongriyu zhongmei zhanlue duihua de yitong,” [The similarities and 
differences between Sino-American and Sino-Japanese strategic dialogue] People’s Net 
(February 17, 2006) at < http://japan.people.com.cn/GB/35464/35488/4115812.html > 
(searched date: November 15, 2012).
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4. Addendum: The 2012 Anti-Japanese Riots
What Happened?
Since 2006, the institutionalization of the relationship has been attempted bit 
by bit and in June 2008 the two countries managed to agree on joint resource 
development in the East China Sea. The relations, however, became instantly 
tensed when in September 2010 a Chinese fishing vessel entered the maritime area 
of the Senkaku Islands and was seized and its crew detained by a Japanese Coast 
Guard patrol boat. The DPJ administration in Japan did not follow to precedent 
and responded the issue by arresting the crew according to Japanese law. Due to 
this reason, China, which follows the basic principle of “not changing the status 
quo,” was strongly provoked.
The trigger for the anti-Japanese riots in September 2012 was provoked by 
Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro’s announcement in Washington on April 16 
that the city of Tokyo would purchase the Senkaku Islands from its owner, a 
private person who had been leasing the islands to the national government. 
Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, who was concerned about the risks 
of this move, informed the city of Tokyo of a plan to nationalize the islands and 
started negotiations with the owner. Anti-Japanese demonstrations reacting to the 
nationalization of the islands enlarged starting on August 19.  On August 27, there 
was an incident in which the Japanese flag was ripped off from the official vehicle 
of Japanese ambassador to China Niwa Uichiro while it was driving.
On September 3, the Japanese government entered into a contract to purchase 
the Senkaku islands for 2.05 billion yen and nationalize them. On September 11, 
the nationalization was officially approved at a cabinet meeting and the transfer 
was completed.  
Completely ignoring the strong statement by Chinese President Hu Jintao to 
firmly oppose Japan’s nationalization of the islands (at the APEC meeting in 
Vladivostok on September 9), the strong backlash from China was said to be due 
to the Japanese government making the official decision to nationalize just two 
days later. This is because President Hu had completely lost face.
The anti-Japanese demonstrations became large-scale, violent, and from 
September 11 spread across the entire country. On September 15, numerous 
Japanese-owned businesses and supermarkets were looted and damaged. In Hunan 
province, almost all of the first to fourth floors of the supermarket Heiwado 
were destroyed. On September 18 (the anniversary of the Mukden incident that 
started Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931), the authorities finally brought the 
demonstrations under control.
The direct trigger for the clash was the “nationalization.” However, the 
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view of the Japanese government, media, and most of the citizenry is that the 
government’s action was due to the concern that if Tokyo purchased the islands, 
Governor Ishihara, who is an anti-China nationalist, would further provoke China 
by constructing a lighthouse and harbor on the island.  
In October, cabinet member Maehara Seiji of the Noda administration revealed 
the following facts in a television address: On August 19, Governor Ishihara 
and Prime Minister Noda had a secret meeting. The prime minister heard from 
the Governor his hardline stance to purchase the islands and not to hesitate 
from starting war with China, and so became gravely concerned that “without 
nationalization, terrible things will happen.”9
Although the demonstrations have calmed down, a fierce exchange of 
criticism is continuing. As if in an attempt by the Chinese government to involve 
international society, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi announced seven times 
at the UN General Assembly in September that Japan stole the Senkaku Islands 
during the First Sino-Japanese war, and strongly criticized Japan as engaging in 
money laundering, using “robber’s logic”. This contrasts with the speech by Prime 
Minister Noda, who stated without pointing fingers that the situation would “be 
resolved according to international law.” China also did not send the governor of 
the People’s Bank of China or the head of the Ministry of Finance to the IMF-
World Bank annual meeting held in Tokyo in mid-October. In a rare move, Japan’s 
ambassador to the US and the Japanese foreign minister submitted contributions 
to the mass media in the US and France, and started to explain the situation to 
each country.
As discussed later, on the one hand, China’s criticism of Japan is very 
fundamental. On the other hand, the Japanese side also fundamentally rejects 
Chinese claims, saying “there is no territorial dispute between the two countries.” 
As a result, no starting point for moderation and negotiation can be found.
Japan’s Official Line
Both sides assert territorial possession of the Senkaku Islands, but let us briefly 
summarize Japan’s assertions that are:
1) Using logic employed through the inclusion of Okinawa prefecture (Japanese 
territory since 1884) since 1885, Japan repeatedly performed detailed 
surveys of the Senkaku Islands, and officially incorporated the territory into 
Japan by cabinet decision in January 1895.
9 “Japanese high official said Prime Minister Noda revealed the aim to buy the Islands” 
Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], at <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2012-10/3184891.
html> (searched date: November 24, 2012).
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2) The Senkaku Islands are not part of Taiwan or the Pescadores Islands, which 
were ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki during the post-war 
settlement of the First Sino-Japanese War, which came into effect in May 
1895.
3) The islands are not included in the territory renounced by Japan in the 
Treaty of San Francisco, which ended World War II. They were placed under 
US administration in accordance with Article III of this treaty, and were 
officially placed under Japanese administration in June 1971 in accordance 
with the Agreement between Japan and the United States Concerning the 
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands. Japan has had effective control ever 
since.
4) China has not consistently been demanding the territory of the Senkaku 
Islands. It was after the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) investigation revealed petroleum resources in this maritime region 
(in 1968) that China and Taiwan starting to make an issue over territorial 
rights in the latter half of 1970.
5) There is no territorial issue between Japan and China.
6) Although the intentions of the Chinese side have been heard in 1972 and 
1978 that the Senkaku issue would not be debated (the words of Zhou 
Enlai in 1972), or would be shelved or jointly developed (Chairman Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978 at a press conference), there is no territorial issue between 
Japan and China.10
Although there are some inside MOFA and several politicians who recognize 
the existence of a territorial issue and are of the opinion that the issue of territorial 
rights should be set aside for repairing the relationship, they are only a few who 
feel this way.
In my view, there are two problems for the Japanese side. The first is that as 
long as Japan cannot depart from the position that “there is no territorial issue 
between Japan and China,” it is not possible to make an explanation to China, 
much less to negotiate with China, and even less to debate “shelving” or “joint 
development.”  Japan has fallen into self-contradiction.
The other is that leadership is ebbing under the chaos of the politics, and 
diplomatic ability has dropped a notch. Much was lost due to the slapdash decision 
of “nationalizing” the islands.
10 The official statements of Japanese government over the Senkaku Islands issue can be 
checked from the website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) : http://www.
mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/senkaku/kenkai.html (Searched  Date: November 15, 2012)
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China’s Official Line
As mentioned previously, it was in the latter half of 1970 that the People’s 
Republic of China and the “Republic of China,” Taiwan, officially asserted 
territorial rights over the Diaoyu Islands.  From 1895 to 1970, China did not once 
assert territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands and did not protest Japanese 
sovereignty.It is well known that in January 8, 1953, the People’s Daily published 
an editorial titled “Support the Battle of the Ryukyuan People against the US” that 
considered the Senkaku Islands to be part of the Ryukyu Islands.
But thereafter, the Senkaku Islands were legally incorporated into Chinese 
territory for the first time in the Law of the Territorial Sea in February 1992, 
saying, “The land territory of the People’s Republic of China includes the 
mainland of the People’s Republic of China and its offshore islands, Taiwan and 
all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; 
the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha 
Islands, as well as all the other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of 
China.”
When Japan’s plan to nationalize became public in the summer of 2012, China 
made clear a hardline stance against Japan. In the white paper on the Diaoyu 
Islands issued on September 25, 2012,  China’s firm and fundamental assertions 
are particularly clear:
1) China was the earliest to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands, in the 14th 
century.  They were under Chinese jurisdiction for a lengthy period, were 
marked as Chinese territory in maps starting in 1579, and are territory 
belonging to China.
2) Japan took advantage of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and “stole” the 
Diaoyu Islands along with Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.
3) The Cairo Declaration in 1943 indicated the return to China of the “territories 
Japan has stolen from the Chinese,” but Japan violated this and has not 
returned the Diaoyu Islands as they should have been.
4) The handling of the Senkaku Islands by the US and Japan respectively 
during the US-Japan negotiations and the Okinawa negotiations in 1951 and 
1971 was illegal and invalid.
5) Japan’s assertion is totally unfounded, and is “a challenge to the post-
war international order established by such legal documents as the Cairo 
Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, and seriously violates the 
obligations Japan should undertake according to international law.”
6) At the time of normalization of relations and the Treaty of Peace of 
Friendship, the leaders of both countries reached the understanding 
of “leaving the issue of the Diaoyu Islands to be resolved later.” The 
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“nationalization,” which violated this, was a severe infringement on Chinese 
sovereignty, undermined the Sino-Japanese relationship, and “rejected and 
challenged the achievements of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War.”11
Why did China, which did not assert territorial rights for a long time until 
1970 make such strong and fundamental assertions in this white paper? Two 
reasons can be considered.The first is the view of international politics since the 
1990s that holds national interests to be absolute.  National interests began to be 
squarely affirmed in China immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident. 
The book entitled An Analysis of China’s National Interest published in 1996 
by Yan Xuetong, a well-known professor of Tsinghua University, was shocking. 
His arguments are as follows: (1) There is no class-conscious characteristics to 
national interests; (2) International interests and national interests can coexist; (3) 
National interests change and develop; (4) Public economic interests expand with 
the growth in economic activity.12
To elaborate on this through the logic of realism, the more China’s economy 
expands and spreads throughout the world, the more national interests that must 
be guarded expand. The precedents of this thinking have already been set at the 
end of the 19th century when a subset of politicians in Japan asserted a lifeline 
theory and a profit line theory, and the military subsequently expanded military 
activities to protect the lifeline and the profit lines. In other words, Yan’s argument 
is essentially a 19th century type theory of sovereignty and theory of profit 
reminiscent of Japanese militarism and German fascism.  
China, which has risen to be an economic powerhouse in the 2000s, has 
been expanding its “national interests that must be guarded”. In the white paper 
on “China’s Peaceful Development” from 2011, state sovereignty, national 
security, territorial integrity, national reunification, China’s political system, and 
sustainable development are set as six “core interests.”13  Thus, China is becoming 
a political and economic powerhouse and the hardening of Chinese diplomacy are 
progressing in tandem.
The second reason for China’s recent assertiveness in territorial matters is the 
rise of the military or conservative military personnel politically. A remarkable 
change can be seen in China’s diplomacy since the end of the 1990s. The influence 
of the foreign ministry has waned and in its place many “new participants” such 
11 State Council of People’s Republic of China, White Paper: Diaoyudao shi zhongguo de guy-
oulingtu, September 25, 2012.
12 Xuetong Yan, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi  [Analysis on China’s National Interests] (Tianjin: 
Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1996).
13 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on China’s Peaceful 
Development [Zhongguo de heeping fazhan] 2011.
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as government offices involved with the economy, state-owned corporations, 
the financial capital sector, the oil capital sector, local governments and netizens 
(citizens who use the internet) have emerged. In a report by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the following characteristics of 
recent Chinese foreign policy decisions were noted:
1) The jurisdiction for foreign policy decisions has become more finely 
segmented, and the foreign ministry only constitutes one part of that.
2) The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and individual officers have started to 
freely appear in public debate. 
3) State-owned corporations and oil capital lie behind the military personnel. In 
policy decisions, instead of political intervention by the military, there is a 
state of “segmented authoritarianism.”
4) Among the new participants, the view that the national interest should be 
pursued more actively is dominant. 14
There is a Chinese Major General named Luo Yuan who is the deputy secretary 
general of the Chinese Academy of Military Science. He calls himself a “rational 
hawk,” rejects the idea that “a skilled hawk hides its talons,” and in the place of 
“shelving” or “joint development,” asserts “active conflict resolution” and “joint 
development with China at the lead.”15 His argument about the Senkaku islands 
dispute is exactly the same as the white paper on the Diaoyu Islands discussed 
above. The white paper is founded on a hard military perspective much like his.
Two of China’s problems should be noted. The first is that the leadership 
is weakening. The incident of Bo Xilai indicated that there are large fissures 
of power at the core. No matter who the new leaders will be, they will not be 
able to exert the kind of strong leadership seen in the past. The other problem 
is the prevalence of naked nationalism and populism. The recent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations exposed that the central government is being exposed to the 
destructive pressure of spontaneous nationalism, and control has become quite 
difficult.16
If these two dynamics become linked, this will cause troubles because within 
the leadership, the only shared identity would be anti-Japanese, popular support 
14 Linda Jakobson, Dean Knox (Tatsumi Okabe trans.),Chugoku no atarashii taigai 
seisaku[New Foreign Policy Actors in China], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010).
15 See Luo Yuan’s statements in the TV show: conference on China’s future strategy in the 
coming ten years [Weilai shinian de Zhongguo guoji zhanlüe yantaohui] at<http://my.tv.sohu.
com/u/vw/30674077> (searched date: November 4, 2012).
16 Yongnian Zheng, “Zhongriguanxi yu minzuzhuyi” [Sino-Japanese Relations and 
Nationalism], Aisixiang Net (October 2, 2012) at < http://www.aisixiang.com/data/57798.html 
> (searched date: November 15, 2012).
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would be gained in direct proportion to the firmness of the anti-Japanese line, and 
anti-Japanese hardline tendencies would spread.
The Characteristics of the 2012 Riots
There were already anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, but once the main 
actor of that time, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, left the stage, both 
countries timidly moved in the direction of a “mutually beneficial relationship 
based on common strategic interests.”  However, the appearance of anti-Japan 
demonstrations in China changed in 2012.The characteristics of the 2012 conflict 
are as follows.
First, in contrast to 2005 which was solely about the history problem, the 
situation of the standoff in 2012 has expanded across the board starting from 
concrete interests of territory and maritime regions to power struggles and the 
history problem. According to Figure 3, “Issues between Japan and China,” this is 
an overall conflict including interests on the third level, power on the second level, 
and history/values on the first level. In particular, even after the demonstrations 
were brought under control, Beijing continued retaliatory diplomatic actions as it 
canceled most of the cultural and economic exchanges for the 40th anniversary of 
diplomatic normalization between Japan and China, indicating a breakdown in the 
relationship even at the level of the citizenry, and this will likely leave a deep scar. 
Second, this time, particularly on the Chinese side, there has been a strong 
tendency towards popular nationalism and populism. It is astonishing that such 
masses were mobilized across the entire country in a short period of time. The 
2012 anti-Japanese riots indicate two facts: that the only identity for Chinese 
society is an anti-Japanese one, and that the more firmly anti-Japanese a leader is, 
the more the masses will support him or her. It can also be said that the legitimacy 
of Chinese rulers lies in their “anti-Japaneseness.”
China’s bare anti-Japanese nationalism induces a countering nationalism 
in Japan. The countering nationalism is linked to Japanese self-armament and 
strengthening of the US-Japan military alliance. It is truly a historical paradox that 
the very anti-Japanese actions of Chinese people condemning Japan’s war crimes 
are driving Japanese militarization and military tension in East Asia.
Third, this incident occurred in a period of power vacuum in both China and 
Japan, in the gap of eroded governance. The political situation in China leading 
up to the 18th National Party Congress cannot be called stable. The Bo Xilai 
incident in April was not caused only by a simple scandal. The roots lie in a fierce 
struggle for power within the leadership. At the same time, there was the standoff 
regarding the fundamental question of the future direction of socio-economic and 
political development, the one between furthering marketization or treading the 
path of state capitalism. In the fifth leadership generation since the revolution, the 
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governing power of the Chinese Communist Party is declining and its legitimacy 
has been eroding. The structure of a solely anti-Japanese identity derives from 
this.
On the other hand, what about Japan? The new DPJ administration came to 
power in 2009 with high expectations of the people, but hope for political change 
was dashed in all manner of ways. Still, even if authority were to return to the 
Liberal Democratic Party, it is not expected that this would be able to save Japan 
from the lack of leadership, the loss of orientation and gridlock in domestic 
and foreign affairs, and stagnation of the economy. The lack of caution in the 
government’s diplomacy toward China since 2010, the nationalization measure 
without an announcement of a basic principle regarding the Senkaku Islands issue 
to the citizens and to the international society in particular, the lack of leadership 
and the dysfunctional diplomacy have exacerbated the Japan-China conflict.
Japan and China are both facing a weakening leadership and a decline in 
governance. This will likely remain unchanged in the short term. The 2012 
conflict may bring about a “new Cold War” that endures for a long time between 
the two countries.
5. Can a "Sino-Japanese New Cold War” be 
    Avoided?
The impact of the anti-Japanese riots in 2012 is large. From their contents and 
characteristics, it is hard to see a future of warm Sino-Japanese relations. It 
appears that Japan and China will enter a new Cold War, which will continue 
for at least in the medium term. Let us consider what can be done to avoid such 
a new Cold War. First, there is the possibility of negotiation. In order to put the 
conflict over territory on the negotiating table, the following conditions are needed 
minimally:
1) Being able to explain that “nationalization” is not a change of the status quo 
regarding the Senkaku Islands.
2) The Japanese government being able to extricate itself from the fiction that 
“there is no territorial issue between Japan and China.”
3) Being able to agree on the “tacit understanding” over shelving or joint 
development.
Second, let us consider what could happen if the state of the territorial issue 
were effectively frozen. As for China, sudden changes in foreign policy are not 
out of the question. China has frequently explained policy shifts with the word 
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“adjustment.” This is according to the proverb that a wise man will change his 
mind, but a fool will never do so. China’s policy towards Japan has fluctuated 
between appeasement and firmness. Primarily when the two countries have 
become too close for economic reasons, the history problem has periodically been 
brought up to revised policies towards to a harder line. China is fundamentally 
seeking “profit.”  If a strong negative effect arises on the domestic economy due 
to the bottleneck of the territorial issue, it is thoroughly possible that China could 
turn from principle and shift towards actual benefit.  
The problem is in the Japanese side. The major character of Japan’s China 
policy is the maintaining of consistency. What the Japanese diplomatic authorities 
mostly concern in the 1972 negotiations was how to maintaining consistency with 
the “fictional” China policy that had existed since the 1950s, which treated Taiwan 
as a legitimate regime representing all China.17 China’s diplomacy “changes its 
mind. ” By contrast, Japan cannot.
There is a more serious problem. The 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations may 
determine the future course of Japan. Through the fierce criticism of Japan and 
the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations, Japan’s image of China hit rock bottom. 
Feelings of dislike and of being threatened by “eerie China” and “high-handed 
China” are spreading through all levels of the Japanese society. Politicians are 
also leaning towards strengthening defense and making military preparations. An 
analysis by a private think tank related to the CIA came to the conclusion that a 
more powerful China and the anti-Japanese demonstrations regarding the Senkaku 
Islands “may compel Japan to abandon the pacifist stance it has maintained since 
the end of World War II.”18 Still, Japan is generally becoming more conservative 
and militaristic. The more Japanese militarism is criticized as the historical 
background to the territory problem, the more Japanese public opinion becomes 
stiff, conservative, and militaristic those who argue for increased armament rejoice 
and the bilateral relationship becomes tense. Can China not understand this ironic 
structure? When Japan abandons “passive pacifism,” East Asia will face a new 
crisis and it will become difficult to avoid a new Cold War. The key may be held 
by the military presence and political leadership of the US.  
The third issue is the severe economic impact of a breakdown of Sino-Japanese 
relations.  The world economy already has global problems, and the Chinese 
economy is already entering a period of deceleration. Just as the Japan Committee 
for Economic Development directly pressed the government for improved 
relations with China in 2005, Japan’s economic dependence on China has become 
17 On this point, see Hattori, Ryuji, Nicchu kokko seijoka [Sino-Japanese Diplomatic 
Normalization] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho 2011).
18 “Dispute with China Forces Japan to Rethink Pacifist Stance,” LIGNET (1 October 2012) at 
<http://www.lignet.com/SpecialPages> (searched date: November  4, 2012).
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pressure towards political compromise. Given the current situation, will China, 
which is sensitive to making profit, take diplomatic initiative to suppress a 
negative impact on its economy?
A Three-Pronged Emergency Proposal
Most importantly, an unforeseen military conflict could occur in the East China 
Sea. This situation must be avoided. This article concludes the following three 
points as an emergency proposal.
First, in order to avoid an unforeseen collision of fishing boats or maritime 
patrol vessels, and to prevent the situation if such an unfortunate contingency 
should occur, a high-level crisis management emergency channel should be 
established between Japan and China. This is the minimum responsibility that 
should be fulfilled by the governments in both sides.
Second, the Sino-Japanese relations should start afresh. To do so, at a minimum 
the following preparation is necessary: (1) Putting the “territorial issue” on the 
agenda; (2) Restoring the “tacit understanding” over joint development or shelving 
the territorial issue, and returning to the old state of affairs; (3) Becoming serious 
about the institutionalization that started in 2006 (This includes the strategic 
dialogue, the high-level economic dialogue, the security dialogue, and the History 
Research Committee), and (4) Newly create a comprehensive dialogue mechanism 
between Japan and China. This would be a dialogue mechanism that assembles 
the political, economic, cultural, and academic worlds of both sides, and would 
convene in particular when relations worsen.
Third, in order to create regional public goods, the advanced country of 
Japan and the economic powerhouse of China should initiate joint actions. This 
would preferably relate to non-traditional security such as an Asian earthquake 
measurement and prediction center, an Asian epidemic prevention mechanism, or 
the concept of Asian emergency foundation. Come to think of it, for the 40 years 
since normalization of relations, China and Japan have never undertaken a joint 
eactions that go beyond self-interest and that benefits the region.
There is no doubt that an East Asian Community or an Asia-Pacific Community 
is the goal of the countries of Asia. But the path towards it is precipitous. The first 
step is to be made by Japan, China, and South Korea, which lead East Asia, by 
extricating themselves from boorish nationalism, juvenile populism, and a naked 
doctrine of national interest.
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